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EVOLVING ISSUES IN REINSURANCE
DISPUTES: THE POWER OF ARBITRATORS
Robert W. DiUbaldo*
INTRODUCTION
Due to its efficient and cost-effective nature, arbitration is often
the preferred approach for resolving reinsurance and other com-
plex commercial business disputes.1  For this reason, reinsurance
contracts, as well as many other commercial agreements, often con-
tain arbitration clauses requiring that any and all disputes arising
under the contract be resolved by arbitration.2  The Federal Arbi-
tration Act (“FAA”) governs most reinsurance arbitrations in the
United States.3
Arbitration is a creature of a contract, and the powers that arbi-
trators possess originate from the parties, who agree to confer spe-
cific powers on the arbitrators—either through an arbitration
clause in the contract or through a separate agreement.4  Typically,
* Robert W. DiUbaldo is an associate in the Insurance and Reinsurance Depart-
ment at the New York office of Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge, LLP.  He received
his B.A. in Literature and Rhetoric from Binghamton University in 2001, and his J.D.
from Fordham University School of Law in 2004, where he served as Managing Editor
of the Fordham Urban Law Journal.  The views expressed in this article are solely
those of the author and do not reflect the views of his firm or their clients.
1. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.04 (2d ed. 2000).
2. Parties to an arbitration agreement generally agree to resolve their disputes
before either a single arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators.  As stated by one notable
commentator:  “Arbitration clauses in reinsurance contracts have provided an effi-
cient and effective means of resolving commercial disputes between the parties by
enabling them to submit their cases to a panel of experts who render an award based
on their understanding of reinsurance custom and practice.” See id. §§ 5.04, 14.03[d].
For examples of arbitration clauses, see also ROBERT W. STRAIN, REINSURANCE CON-
TRACT WORDING 90-92 (3d ed. 1998).
3. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2007).  The FAA creates a body of federal substan-
tive law of arbitrability that is applicable to any arbitration agreement within the
scope of the Act. See also New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 90 F.3d 58, 61
(2d Cir. 1996) (quoting PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1198 (2d Cir. 1996)).
4. For example, reinsurance contracts often contain “honorable engagement”
clauses and similar language which courts have interpreted as providing arbitrators
with wide discretion to interpret procedural and substantive issues and interpret an
agreement with regard to the intent of the parties.  STRAIN, supra note 2, at 92-93.  A R
sample honorable engagement clause is as follows:  “The Panel shall interpret this
Agreement as an honorable engagement rather than as merely a legal obligation and
shall make its decision considering the custom and practice of the applicable insur-
ance and reinsurance business . . . .” Id.
83
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arbitration clauses found in reinsurance agreements confer broad
power on arbitrators with respect to certain procedural or substan-
tive issues.5  As discussed below, where an arbitration clause enu-
merates specific powers to arbitrators, it is rare that parties
challenge an exercise of those powers.  Parties often challenge an
arbitrator’s actions, however, where the arbitrator acts in a manner
not expressly provided for in the contract.  In such instances, courts
will look to the language of the parties’ contract, as well as the
FAA, to determine whether an arbitrator has exceeded his
powers.6
Cases discussed in this Article suggest that courts often struggle
to grasp the extent of arbitral powers pursuant to the interplay be-
tween arbitration agreements contained in reinsurance contracts,
industry custom and practice, and the FAA.  The result has been
contradictory and often inconsistent decisions in this area of the
law.
This Article examines emerging areas of the law governing cer-
tain procedural powers of arbitrators that has impacted and will
continue to impact reinsurance arbitrations, as well as other com-
mercial disputes.  Specifically, the Article focuses on an arbitrator’s
powers with respect to the following procedural issues:  (i) consoli-
dation; (ii) non-party discovery; (iii) confidentiality; (iv) summary
adjudication; and (v) the enforceability of a hold harmless
agreement.
I. CONSOLIDATION
The issue of whether multiple disputes among related parties
should be consolidated often arises in reinsurance arbitrations,
where many contracts involve several reinsurers sharing a certain
risk ceded to them by a single insurer, known as a cedent.7  Until
recently, the majority of case law has not supported consolidation,
absent specific language in the parties’ contract.8
5. See id. at 90-93.
6. See, e.g., Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d
255, 262 (2d Cir. 2003).
7. EUGENE WOLLAN, HANDBOOK OF REINSURANCE LAW § 8.07[G] (2003).
8. See Local 1351 Int’l Longshoremens Ass’n v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 214 F.3d
566, 570-71 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that the FAA only grants the district court the
power to enforce consolidation if it is expressly provided for in the contract). Accord
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995); U.K. v. Boeing Co.,
998 F.2d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1993); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107,
108 (6th Cir. 1991). But see Phila. Reins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, No. 02-
1943, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6198, at *10-12 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2003) (holding that an
informal agreement was sufficient to bind parties to consolidate arbitration); see also
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A sample consolidation clause in a reinsurance contract may ap-
pear as follows:  “If more than one reinsurer is involved in an arbi-
tration where there are common questions of law or fact and a
possibility of conflicting awards or inconsistent results, all such
reinsurers will constitute and act as one party for purpose of this
clause.”9
A party seeking to enforce consolidation in an arbitration agree-
ment may petition the court to do so pursuant to section 4 of the
FAA, which provides that “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged fail-
ure, neglect or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement.”10  Although the language
of this statute seems clear, courts have interpreted it in a variety of
ways.
Early interpretations of section 4 held that an arbitration panel
lacked the authority to order consolidation.  In Del E. Webb Con-
struction v. Richardson Hospital Authority, the Fifth Circuit held
that under section 4 of the FAA:
The question of consolidation . . . is for the district court because
the court must determine only whether the contract provides for
consolidated arbitration, a question free of the underlying facts.
Moreover, it is unclear how separate arbitrations could be con-
solidated by one of the arbitrators.  In short . . . under § 4 of the
Federal Arbitration Act the sole question for the district court is
whether there is a written agreement among the parties provid-
ing for consolidated arbitration.11
Other courts have held that consolidation was only appropriate
with the parties’ consent or if the contract expressly provided for
consolidation.12
A new line of cases, however, has emerged from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., in which
the Court held that “issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e., whether
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 210 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a district court can consolidate arbitration proceedings if it finds that the
parties implicitly consented to consolidation).
9. Robert M. Hall, Consolidation of Arbitrations—A New Rule Emerging?, 15-12
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. REINSURANCE 13 (2004).
10. 9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 2007).
11. 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987).
12. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)
(holding that district courts do not have the power under the FAA to consolidate
arbitrations absent the parties’ consent).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-1\FUJ103.txt unknown Seq: 4 18-JAN-08 14:58
86 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other
conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met,
are for the arbitrators to decide.”13  Thus, “‘procedural questions
which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition’ are
presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.”14
Post-Howsam decisions have interpreted consolidation as a pro-
cedural issue best left in the hands of arbitrators.15  For example,
following the Howsam decision in 2002, the First Circuit held in
Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, Local 791 that the issue of whether multiple grievances
before the American Arbitration Association should be consoli-
dated into a single proceeding was for the arbitrator, not the court,
to decide.16  The First Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court’s
2003 decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, where the
Court held that arbitrators should decide procedural questions and
issues of contract interpretation.17
In 2004 the United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts cited Shaw Supermarkets, Inc. with approval in Employ-
ers Insurance of Wausau v. First State Insurance Group and noted
that “[u]nder Howsam . . . this [consolidation] is a procedural mat-
ter for the arbitrator.”18
This trend continued in 2005 when several federal district courts
held that consolidation was an issue of contract interpretation and
arbitration procedure—matters that parties would expect arbitra-
13. 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
14. Id. at 84 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557
(1964)).
15. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Cravens Dargan & Co., 197 F.
App’x 645, 647 (9th Cir. 2006); Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Century Indem. Co.,
443 F.3d 573, 576-77 (7th Cir. 2006); Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. United Food and
Commercial Workers Union, Local 791, 321 F.3d 251, 254 (1st Cir. 2003); Employers
Ins. of Wausau v. First State Ins. Group, 324 F. Supp. 2d 333, 336-37 (D. Mass. 2004).
16. 321 F.3d at 255 (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83-84 (2002)).
17. 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003).  In Green Tree, the Supreme Court considered
whether an arbitration panel can address disputes arising under identical arbitration
provisions in contracts between a commercial lender and several of its clients in class
arbitration. Id. at 447.  The South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the arbitra-
tion provisions as permitting class arbitration. Id.  The Supreme Court overruled the
South Carolina Supreme Court and held that the arbitral tribunal, and not the court,
had the requisite authority to decide whether class arbitration was appropriate. Id. at
454.  The Court noted that “arbitrators are well situated” to answer questions con-
cerning contract interpretation or arbitration procedures. Id. at 452-53.
18. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
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tors to decide.19  In Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Century In-
demnity Co., the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to
consolidate multiple arbitrations brought by members of a reinsur-
ance program against their reinsurer, Lloyd’s, because the reinsur-
ance contracts at issue did not explicitly provide for
consolidation.20  The program members did not move the Court to
compel consolidation of multiple arbitrations, but rather initially
submitted a single demand for arbitration against Lloyd’s.21
Lloyd’s challenged this procedure, arguing that it had not con-
sented to consolidation and that the reinsurance contracts did not
provide for this option for resolving disputes between the parties.22
The Court held that, although the program members did not seek
an order consolidating the disputes, there was no contractual lan-
guage supporting consolidation and, even if there was, such a re-
quest must be directed towards the arbitration panel.23
Over the past two years, courts appear to have erased whatever
doubts remained as to whether consolidation is an issue properly
left to arbitrators.24  In a case of first impression, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held in Employers Insurance Co. of Wausau v. Century Indem-
nity Co. that the question of whether an arbitration agreement
between a reinsurer and its reinsured prohibited consolidated arbi-
tration was a procedural one for the arbitrators to determine.25
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Howsam and the First
Circuit’s decision in Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
characterized consolidation as a “procedural issue” and a “matter
of contract interpretation” that an arbitration panel is well suited
to address.26
Similarly, in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Cravens Dargan
& Co., the Ninth Circuit, citing Howsam and Green Tree, noted
that under the FAA, “courts may only decide certain gateway mat-
ters, such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement
19. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v Century Indem. Co., No. 05-2809,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16675, at *6-8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2005); Blimpie Int’l Inc. v.
Blimpie of the Keys, 371 F. Supp. 2d 469, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
20. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16675, at *6-8.
21. Id. at *6.
22. Id. at *7-8.
23. Id. at *8.
24. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Cravens Dargan & Co., 197 F.
App’x 645, 647 (9th Cir. 2006); Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Century Indem. Co.,
443 F.3d 573, 577-78 (7th Cir. 2006); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Global Reinsurance Corp.,
No. 06 Civ. 4419, 2006 WL 2289999, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2006).
25. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, 443 F.3d at 577-78.
26. Id. at 578.
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at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to
a certain type of controversy.”27  The appellate court affirmed the
district court’s decision that it was for the arbitrators to decide
whether a single arbitration panel should resolve multiple reinsur-
ance disputes.28
Other recent decisions have further cemented an arbitrator’s
powers with respect to consolidation.  In In re Allstate Insurance
Co., the court ordered a panel of arbitrators to decide whether dis-
putes arising from two reinsurance contracts should be consoli-
dated and noted that “submitting the question of consolidation to
an arbitration panel comports with the strong federal policy favor-
ing out-of-court resolution of arbitrable controversies.”29  In an-
other case, the Third Circuit relied upon Green Tree and Howsam,
and held that the issue of consolidated or separate arbitration pro-
ceedings concerns matters of contract interpretation, not arbi-
trability, and thus was an issue for arbitrators to decide.30
Additionally, in Dockser v. Schwartzberg, the Fourth Circuit, while
specifically ruling on a different issue, noted that procedural ques-
tions should be remitted to arbitrators, specifically citing
consolidation.31
Based on the cases discussed above, it appears that the consoli-
dation issue has now been resolved in favor of preserving that
power for arbitrators.  Indeed, the First, Third, Fourth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits, as well as a district court in the Second Circuit,
have held that this issue is properly left for arbitrators to decide.32
An underlying theme in the recent decisions is that courts are wary
of imposing their own views of efficiency in arbitral disputes, thus
interfering with parties’ agreements to arbitrate.  Supreme Court
decisions in Howsam and Green Tree have provided courts ad-
dressing this issue with ample precedent.
Although the law is becoming more settled in this area, practical
problems remain.  For example, a dispute between the same parties
involving several reinsurance contracts with arbitration agreements
may result in the formation of multiple arbitration panels—before
the consolidation issue is either raised by one of the parties or de-
27. 197 F. App’x at 646-47 (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537
U.S. 79, 84-85 (2002)).
28. Id. at 647.
29. No. 06 Civ. 4419(DAB), 2006 WL 2289999, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2006).
30. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Westchester Fire Ins., 489 F.3d 580,
585-86 (3d Cir. 2007).
31. 433 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2006).
32. See supra notes 15-30 and accompanying text. R
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cided by a given panel.  In such a situation, lack of clarity as to
which arbitrators have the authority to address the issue may lead
to additional disputes.  Moreover, parties could subject themselves
to conflicting decisions from different panels.  As the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada:  “Arbitral panels are ad hoc, making it
difficult to coordinate their decisions on such a question.  And
there are no contractual or statutory provisions for transferring
cases between panels, should multiple arbitrations be commenced
when the contract envisaged a single consolidated one.”33  As such,
consolidation remains an issue of which arbitrators, practitioners,
insurers, reinsurers, and other commercial entities should be wary.
II. NONPARTY DISCOVERY
Perhaps no issue involving the power of arbitrators has been the
subject of more debate over the past few years than nonparty
discovery.
Section 7 of the FAA provides, among other things, that “arbi-
trators . . . or a majority of them, may summon in writing any per-
son to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in
proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document,
or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the case.”34
Section 7 further states that an arbitral subpoena “shall be served
in the same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify before the
court.”35
While this language is fairly straightforward on its face, courts
have struggled to balance the discovery powers available to arbitra-
tors under the FAA with the goals of arbitration—avoiding the
burden, expenses, harassment, and lack of efficiency commonly as-
sociated with discovery in litigation.36
A. The Territorial Limitations of a Panel’s Authority to Compel
Nonparty Discovery
Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) gov-
erns the service and enforcement of subpoenas, including subpoe-
nas that an arbitration panel issues pursuant to section 7 of the
33. 210 F.3d 771, 773 (7th  Cir. 2000).
34. 9 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 2007).
35. Id.
36. See GRAYDON S. STARING, LAW OF REINSURANCE § 22.2 (1998).
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FAA.37  FRCP 45, and thus section 7 of the FAA, places limitations
on the territorial reach of nonparty subpoenas.38  Specifically,
FRCP 45 provides that a subpoena must be served “within the dis-
trict” of the court enforcing the subpoena or “within 100 miles of
the place of deposition, hearing, trial, production or inspection
specified in the subpoena.”39
With respect to nonparties, FRCP 45 states that a court shall
quash or modify a subpoena if it:
[R]equires a person who is not a party or an officer of a party to
travel to a place more than 100 miles from the place where that
person resides, is employed or regularly transacts business in
person, except that . . . such a person may in order to attend trial
be commanded to travel from any such place within the state in
which the trial is held.40
Nonetheless, early decisions addressing the scope of arbitral sub-
poenas served on nonparties illustrate that both courts and arbitra-
tors were reluctant to apply the jurisdictional limits of FRCP 45
and section 7 of the FAA.41
Prior to 2006, only two federal circuit courts had addressed the
issue of whether an arbitration panel had the authority to sub-
poena documents and testimony from a nonparty outside the 100-
mile limits of FRCP 45.  In 2000, the Eighth Circuit held in In re
Security Life Insurance Co. of America that the geographic limits of
37. Dynegy Midstream Serves., LP v. Trammochem, 451 F.3d 89, 94-96 (2d Cir.
2006).
38. Id.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2). FRCP 45 provides, as follows:
Subject to the provisions of clause (ii) of subparagraph (c)(3)(A) of this rule,
a subpoena may be served at any place within the district of the court by
which it is issued, or at any place without the district that is within 100 miles
of the place of the deposition, hearing, trial, production, inspection, copying,
testing, or sampling specified in the subpoena or at any place within the state
where a state statute or rule of court permits service of a subpoena issued by
a state court of general jurisdiction sitting in the place of the deposition,
hearing, trial, production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling specified
in the subpoena.
Id.
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A).
41. See In re Security Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 872 (8th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that the 100-mile territorial limit does not apply to a subpoena requesting docu-
ments but might to a subpoena requesting deposition testimony); Amgen Inc. v.
Kidney Ctr. of Del. County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878, 882-83 (N.D. Ill. 1995), remanded
on other grounds, 95 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that because the parties agreed
to arbitrate their dispute pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
45(a)(3)(B) provided a mechanism for arbitrators to compel deposition and testimony
from a nonparty located outside the 100-mile barrier).
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FRCP 45 do not apply to an arbitral subpoena requesting docu-
ments from a nonparty, since “the burden of producing documents
need not increase appreciably with an increase in the distance
those documents must travel.”42  Notably, while the Eighth Circuit
addressed the subpoenas as applied to documents sought from a
nonparty, it did not address whether the territorial limits would ap-
ply to a nonparty forced to travel over 100 miles to testify at a
hearing or deposition.43
In 2002, the Third Circuit held in Legion Insurance Co. v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. that an arbitration panel sit-
ting in Pennsylvania could not subpoena a nonparty in Florida to
produce certain documents and employee testimony, as the geo-
graphic limits of the FRCP limited an arbitrator’s subpoena power
under section 7 of FAA.44  Several decisions over the past year may
have resolved the apparent split between federal circuit courts on
this issue, suggesting that courts may apply the 100-mile rule to
nonparty subpoenas on a more consistent basis going forward.
In early 2006, the Northern District of Georgia’s decision in Fes-
tus & Helen Stacy Foundation, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner
& Smith Inc. rejected the Third Circuit’s decision in Legion Insur-
ance Co. and held that that territorial limits of FRCP 45 do not
apply to the enforcement of a nonparty subpoena for documents
issued by arbitrators under the FAA.45  Notably the court’s holding
in that case relied heavily upon the Southern District of New
York’s decision in In re Arbitration of Trammochem.46  The Second
Circuit later reversed the Southern District of New York’s decision
and held that an arbitral subpoena was subject to the geographical
42. In re Security Life, 228 F.3d at 871-72.
43. Id. (“However, as the only live controversy in this case concerns the panel’s
subpoena of documents, we must reserve the question for another day.”).  In 2004, a
federal district court addressing this issue also held that an arbitration panel sitting in
Minnesota had the authority to enforce a subpoena compelling the production of doc-
uments from a nonparty in New York, but not the prehearing deposition of that non-
party.  SchlumbergerSema, Inc. v. Xcel Energy, Inc., No. Civ. 02-4304, 2004 WL
67647, at *1-3 (D. Minn. Jan. 9, 2004).
44. Legion Ins. Co. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F. App’x 26, 27-28 (3d
Cir. 2002) (“[U]nder the FAA, Rule 45 also governs the service of arbitration subpoe-
nas . . . a subpoena duces tecum issued by a federal court cannot be served upon a
nonparty for the production of documents located outside the geographic boundaries
specified in Rule 45.”).
45. Festus & Helen Stacy Found., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith
Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
46. In re Arbitration of Trammochem, No. 05 MISC.M8-85, 2005 WL 1400096, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2005), rev’d and remanded, Dynegy Midstream Services, LP v.
Trammochem, 451 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2006).
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limits of FRCP 45.47  Therefore, the precedential value of Festus &
Helen Stacy Foundation, Inc. may be limited.
In Dynegy Midstream Services, the Second Circuit rejected a
New York City-based arbitration panel’s attempt to serve a sub-
poena on a nonparty in Texas.48  The Court noted that the FAA
does “not contemplate nationwide service of process or enforce-
ment; instead, both service and enforcement proceedings have
clear territorial limitations.”49  The Court found that “not even the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration can lead to jurisdiction
over a non-party without some basis in federal law.”50  Moreover,
the Second Circuit emphasized that since the parties had chosen to
arbitrate their dispute in New York, they could not be allowed to
“stretch the law beyond the text of [s]ection 7 [of the FAA] and
Rule 45 to inconvenience witnesses.”51
In February 2007, in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. White
Mountains Insurance Group Ltd., a federal court in Massachusetts
also held that arbitral subpoenas served on nonparties are subject
to the 100-mile jurisdictional restrictions set forth by FRCP
45(b)(2), quashing subpoenas that a Massachusetts-based arbitra-
tion panel issued on a nonparty in New Hampshire for production
of documents within 100 miles of the nonparty’s New Hampshire
office.52  The Court rejected Liberty Mutual’s argument that, pur-
suant to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in In re Security Life Insur-
ance Company of America, the geographic restrictions embodied in
FRCP 45(b)(2) do not apply to subpoenas issued by arbitrators,53
and instead relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in Dynegy Mid-
stream Services.54
47. Dynegy Midstream Services, 451 F.3d at 95.
48. Id. at 94-95.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 96.
51. Id.  The Second Circuit also rejected the suggestion that it should adopt the
court’s position in Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Center of Delaware County, Ltd., 879 F.
Supp. 878, 883 (N.D. Ill. 1995), where the district court enforced an arbitral subpoena
seeking documents from a party outside the 100-mile limit by permitting an attorney
for a party to the arbitration to issue a subpoena that would be enforced by the dis-
trict court in the district in which the nonparty resided, as provided by Rule
45(a)(3)(B).
52. No. 06-11901 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2007), reprinted in 17-22 MEALEY’S LITIG.
REP. REINSURANCE 4 (2007).
53. See Liberty’s Opposition to White Mountains Insurance Group Ltd’s Motion
to Dismiss Petition of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company for Order Enforcing Arbi-
tration Panel’s Subpoena Duces Tecum at 8-9 n.2, Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 06-11901-
GAO, (Nov. 22, 2006).
54. See Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 06-11901.
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The Court offered the following hypothetical to support its
decision:
I would say that I also agree that the service under the statute is
to be made in accordance with the way a similar subpoena
would be served under federal practice.  I don’t think that in-
vokes all the provisions of Rule 45, but only the service provi-
sions.  And I think that includes the service may be done in
accordance with Rule 45(b)(2), I think it is, within the district or
within a bubble of 100 miles from the place of the sitting of the
tribunal.
I think the interpretation that’s argued for by Liberty is way too
expansive.  And if I’m understanding it correctly, would permit
me to issue or enforce a subpoena that called for a company
located in Sacramento to produce documents in San Francisco
as long as they were within 100 miles of each other. I think that
would be a strange rule that a court sitting in Boston could do
that.  I certainly could not under the federal rules as I read
them.55
Therefore, the District of Massachusetts lacked authority to en-
force the subpoenas since the nonparty was served outside the 100-
mile geographical limits of FRCP 45.56
While the law on this issue is yet to be settled, these decisions
indicate that courts may be moving toward a universal application
of the territorial restrictions of FRCP 45 with respect to nonparty
subpoenas arbitrators issue under the FAA.  Indeed, the Second
and Third Circuits have incorporated such a rule, and it appears
the First Circuit would as well after the District of Massachusetts’s
decision in Liberty Mutual.57  Moreover, recent decisions have re-
jected cases that refused to apply the 100-mile limitation to arbitral
subpoenas, including the Eighth Circuit’s decision in In re Security
Life Insurance Co. of America.58  A uniform adoption of this rule
would have a significant impact on an arbitrator’s subpoena power
under the FAA.
Nevertheless, even where jurisdiction over a nonparty was estab-
lished, courts have reached different conclusions regarding an arbi-
trator’s authority to demand certain types of prehearing discovery
under the FAA.
55. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 14, Liberty Mut. Ins., No.
06-11901-GAO, (Feb. 26, 2007).
56. Id.
57. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. R
58. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text. R
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B. An Arbitrator’s Authority to Compel
Prehearing Depositions
Recent case law continues to illustrate judicial resistance to-
wards permitting arbitrators to compel nonparties to attend depo-
sitions prior to the ultimate hearing on the matter.  While 2006 did
not feature a decision on this issue, cases from the past few years
have uniformly held that arbitrators lack the authority under sec-
tion 7 of the FAA to compel prehearing depositions.59
Several early cases from federal district courts held that an arbi-
trator possessed the authority to compel nonparties to be deposed
prior to the arbitration.60  In 1988, the Southern District of Florida
held in Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis that section 7 of
the FAA permits arbitrators to compel nonparties to appear for
depositions prior to the hearing.61  The Court noted that under the
FAA, “arbitrators may order and conduct such discovery as they
find necessary.”62  A few years later in Amgen Inc. v. Kidney
Center of Delaware County, Ltd., discussed above, the Northern
District of Illinois enforced a subpoena issued by a panel against a
nonparty to produce documents and testify at a deposition for use
in an arbitration.63
Subsequent to these decisions, however, two federal circuit
courts that addressed the powers of arbitrators to compel nonparty
discovery under section 7 of the FAA found, at least implicitly, that
an arbitration panel lacked the authority to order nonparties to ap-
59. See, e.g., Hay Group v. E.B.S. Acquisition Group, 360 F.3d 404, 407 (3d Cir.
2004) (noting that nothing in the text of section 7 of the FAA empowers an arbitrator
to compel prehearing depositions); Atmel Corp. v. LM Ericsson Tel., 371 F. Supp. 2d
402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that section 7 does not authorize arbitrators to
issue subpoenas to compel a prehearing deposition of a nonparty); Odfjell ASA v.
Celanese AG, 328 F. Supp. 2d 505, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that an arbitrator
lacked authority under the FAA to issue a subpoena compelling a nonparty to appear
for a prehearing deposition and to produce documents at that time); In re Arbitration
Between Hawaiian Elec. Indus., Inc. & HEI Power Corp., No. M-82, 2004 WL
1542254, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004) (holding that it is beyond the scope of section 7
for an arbitration panel to issue subpoenas for prehearing testimony); In re Arbitra-
tion Between the Procter & Gamble Co. and Allianz Ins. Co., No. 02-cv-5480(KMW),
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26025, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2003) (“[A] distinction . . . must
be drawn between an arbitrator’s power to compel document production before an
arbitration hearing, and her power to compel appearances at depositions before an
arbitration hearing.”).
60. See Amgen Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Del. County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878, 880
(N.D. Ill. 1995); Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241,
1242 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
61. Stanton, 685 F. Supp. at 1242-43.
62. Id. at 1242.
63. Amgen Inc., 879 F. Supp. at 882.
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pear for prehearing depositions.64  In 1999, the Fourth Circuit held
in COMSAT Corp. v. National Science Foundation that an arbitra-
tor may not compel a third party to comply with an arbitral sub-
poena for prehearing discovery “absent a showing of special need
or hardship.”65  The court did not define “special need” except to
say that “at a minimum, a party must demonstrate that the infor-
mation it seeks is otherwise unavailable.”66  Fundamental to the
court’s decision was the fact that parties who agree to arbitrate
their disputes “forego certain procedural rights attendant to formal
litigation in return for a more efficient and cost-effective resolution
of their disputes.”67  For this reason, the court found that a “hall-
mark of arbitration—and a necessary precursor to its efficient op-
eration—is a limited discovery process.”68
Similarly, in 2004, the Third Circuit stated in Hay Group v.
E.B.S. Acquisition Corp. that pursuant to the “unambiguous” lan-
guage of section 7 of the FAA, an arbitrator’s subpoena power is
limited to “situations in which the non-party has been called to ap-
pear in the physical presence of the arbitrator and to hand over the
documents at that time.”69  The Court noted that had the FAA in-
tended to provide arbitrators with the authority to compel prehear-
ing discovery, it would not have placed limitations on those
situations in which a nonparty can be compelled to produce docu-
ments and testimony.70  As such, the court held that an arbitrator
lacks authority to compel prehearing discovery from nonparties,
whether it be deposition testimony or document production.71
64. See Hay Group, 360 F.3d at 407; COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d
269, 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1999).
65. COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d at 278.
66. Id. at 276.
67. Id.
68. Id.  Note that in Deiulemar Compagnia De Navigazione S.P.A. v. M/V Allegra,
198 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit considered the “special need” excep-
tion alluded to in COMSAT.  The court did not define “special need” but observed
that, “at a minimum, a party must demonstrate that the information it seeks is other-
wise unavailable.” Id. at 480.  The court went on to hold that there was a special need
for discovery in circumstances where evidence concerning the condition of a ship’s
engine and hull was crucial to a party’s arbitration claim and where the engine and
hull were undergoing repairs, upon completion of which the ship would depart United
States waters.  In so holding, the court referred to the time-sensitive nature of the
party’s discovery request and the “evanescent nature of the evidence sought.” Id.
69. 360 F.3d at 407.
70. Id. at 408-09 (“If the FAA had been meant to confer the latter, broader power,
we believe that the drafters would have said so, and they would have then had no
need to spell out the more limited power to compel a non-party witness to bring items
with him to an arbitration proceeding.”).
71. Id. at 411.
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A string of recent cases originating from the Southern District of
New York relied upon COMSAT and Hay Group and uniformly
rejected the notion that section 7 of the FAA empowers arbitrators
to compel prehearing depositions.72  For example, in Odfjell ASA
v. Celanese AG, the court refused to enforce a subpoena issued by
an arbitrator compelling a nonparty to appear for a deposition and
produce various documents requested by a party prior to the hear-
ing.73  Following the Third Circuit’s holding in Hay Group, the
court stated that “it would seem particularly inappropriate to sub-
ject parties who never agreed to participate in the arbitration in
any way to the notorious burdens of prehearing discovery.”74
In 2005, the court in Atmel Corp. v. LM Ericsson Telefon, AB,
relied on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in COMSAT, noting that
“the weight of judicial authority favors the view that the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 7, does not authorize arbitrators to is-
sue subpoenas for discovery depositions against third parties.”75
Other recent decisions from federal courts are in accord.76
It should be noted, however, that an unpublished decision from
the Northern District of Illinois in 2004 held that an arbitration
panel had the authority to conduct nonparty depositions prior to
the hearing.77  Relying on a decision from that same court, Amgen,
Inc., the court found that under section 7 of the FAA, “implicit in
the power to compel testimony and documents for purpose[s] of a
hearing is the lesser power to compel such testimony and docu-
72. See supra note 59. R
73. 328 F. Supp. 2d 505, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
74. Id.
75. 371 F. Supp. 2d 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Integrity Ins. Co. v. Amer.
Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that an arbitrator
lacked authority under the FAA to compel a nonparty witness to appear for a deposi-
tion prior to the arbitration hearing); ImClone Sys. Inc. v. Waksal, 802 N.Y.S.2d 653,
654 (App. Div. 2005) (noting that depositions of nonparties may be directed under the
FAA where there is a showing of “special need or hardship, such as where the infor-
mation sought is otherwise unavailable”).
76. See, e.g., Gresham v. Norris, 304 F. Supp. 2d 795, 796-97 (E.D. Va. 2004) (not-
ing that “a federal court may not compel a third party to comply with an arbitrator’s
subpoena for prehearing discovery, absent a showing of special need or hardship”);
SchlumbergerSema, Inc. v. Xcel Energy, Inc., No. Civ. 02-4304PAMJSM, 2004 WL
67647, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 9, 2004) (holding that a panel could compel a nonparty to
produce documents prior to the hearing, but not to attend a deposition); In re Merid-
ian Bulk Carriers, Ltd., No. 03-2011, 2003 WL 23181011, at *1-2 (E.D. La. July 17,
2003) (same).
77. In re Arbitration Between Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Continental
Cas. Co., No. 04-C-7020, at 3-4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2004), reprinted in 15-18 MEALEY’S
LITIG. REP. REINSURANCE 3 (2005).
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ments for purposes prior to [the] hearing.”78  Thus, while it appears
that certain jurisdictions, particularly the Second and Third Cir-
cuits, are moving towards adopting a hard-line rule that arbitrators
do not have the authority to compel a nonparty to be deposed
prior to a hearing, lower courts in the Seventh Circuit and Elev-
enth Circuit have reached the opposite result.
C. The Power to Compel Witness Testimony Before an
Arbitrator Prior to the Final Hearing on the Merits
As noted, section 7 of the FAA authorizes arbitrators to “sum-
mon in writing any person” to appear “before them or any of them
as a witness” and bring documents that may be relevant to the
case.79  While courts have generally found that this language does
not permit arbitrators to subpoena nonparties for prehearing depo-
sitions, recent cases illustrate that arbitrators have the authority to
compel a nonparty to provide documentary and testimonial evi-
dence before them prior to the ultimate hearing.80
In 2005, the Second Circuit in a matter of first impression ex-
amined whether section 7 authorizes arbitrators to summon non-
party witnesses to give testimony and provide material evidence at
a pre-merits hearing before an arbitration panel.81  The nonparties
objected to the subpoenas on the ground that section 7 does not
provide arbitrators with the power to summon nonparties for the
purpose of compelling testimonial and documentary evidence in
advance of the ultimate hearing on the merits.82  The Court noted
that “the language of [s]ection 7 is broad, limited only by the re-
quirement that the witnesses be summoned to appear ‘before [the
arbitrators] or any of them’ and that any evidence requested be
material to the case.”83  Accordingly, while the Second Circuit did
not determine whether the FAA empowers arbitrators to issue pre-
hearing discovery subpoenas to nonparties, it found that arbitrators
78. Id.
79. 9 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 2007).
80. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567, 578-79 (2d Cir. 2005)
(pointing out that under section 7 of the FAA, arbitrators have the power to summon
nonparty witnesses to produce documents and testify before them); Hay Group, Inc.
v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 410-11 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the plain
language of section 7 empowers arbitrators to summon nonparty witnesses before
them, not to issue pre-hearing discovery subpoenas); Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., No.
3:05cv1652 (WWE), 2006 WL 2772695, at *7 (D. Conn., Sept. 25, 2006) (recognizing
procedure set forth in Stolt-Nielsen SA).
81. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 430 F.3d at 577.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 578-79.
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have the authority to require nonparties to appear before them
with documents and provide testimony on relevant issues prior to
the final hearing.84
The Second Circuit’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen SA was consistent
with the Third Circuit’s opinion a year earlier in Hay Group, Inc.,
in which the court held that “[s]ection 7’s language unambiguously
restricts an arbitrator’s subpoena power to situations in which the
non-party has been called to appear in the physical presence of the
arbitrator and to hand over the documents at that time.”85  Note,
however, that unlike the Second Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen SA, the
Third Circuit did not specifically discuss whether arbitrators have
the authority to compel discovery before them prior to the final
hearing on the merits.86
Recently, in Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., the District of Connecticut
recognized Stolt-Nielsen SA for the proposition that arbitrators
may obtain information from a nonparty through a pre-merits
hearing before them.87  The Court noted:
Under section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitrators have
the power to compel a third-party witness to appear with docu-
ments before a single arbitrator, who can then adjourn the pro-
ceedings.  This gives the arbitration panel the effective ability to
require delivery of documents from a third-party in advance,
notwithstanding the limitations of section 7 of the FAA.  In
many instances, of course, the inconvenience of making such a
personal appearance may well prompt the witness to deliver the
documents and waive presence.88
While the court did not specifically address this issue, it cited the
discovery procedure utilized by the arbitrators in Stolt-Nielsen SA
with approval.89
Stolt-Nielsen SA and related decisions have the potential to sig-
nificantly impact the scope of discovery available in arbitrations
because these cases provide arbitrators and parties with another
mechanism to compel prehearing discovery, especially in those ju-
risdictions that do not recognize the authority of arbitrators to or-
der prehearing depositions or document production under the
FAA.  Under Stolt-Nielsen SA, an arbitration panel can convene
84. Id. at 581.
85. Hay Group, Inc., 360 F.3d at 407.
86. Compare id. at 405-14, with Stolt-Nielsen SA, 430 F.3d at 577-80.
87. Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., No. 3:05cv1652 (WWE), 2006 WL 2772695, at *7 (D.
Conn. Sept. 25, 2006).
88. Id. at *8.
89. See id. at *7.
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prior to the final hearing in a matter and require nonparties to ap-
pear before them at a particular location and produce documents
and testimonial evidence.90
This procedure may also provide parties and arbitrators with an
end-run around the 100-mile jurisdictional limits of nonparty arbi-
tral subpoenas that have been enforced by certain jurisdictions.  As
discussed above, several jurisdictions have held that an arbitral
subpoena is only enforceable if properly served on a nonparty
within 100 miles of the location where the arbitrators are “sit-
ting.”91  While courts have yet to specifically address the precise
meaning of “sit,” there is precedent from several federal courts
that a panel is “sitting” in the location where the underlying arbi-
tration is actually taking place.92  Nonetheless, due to the uncer-
tainty on this issue, an arbitration panel could decide to “sit” in a
location other than where the arbitration is taking place but within
100 miles of the nonparty from whom discovery is sought for the
sole purpose of complying with the territorial limits of FRCP 45
and section 7 to obtain nonparty discovery.
D. Prehearing Document Production Under the FAA
Unlike prehearing depositions, arbitrators have more latitude
with respect to ordering nonparty document production.  Indeed,
most jurisdictions have held that arbitrators have the authority to
compel a nonparty to produce documents prior to the hearing and
directly to the parties to the arbitration, though there are some ju-
risdictions that have found otherwise.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits, as well as district courts in the Second, Fifth, Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits have held that the FAA empowers arbitrators to
compel prehearing document discovery from nonparties.93  One of
90. See 430 F.3d at 578-79.
91. See supra notes 48-56. R
92. See Gresham v. Norris, 304 F. Supp. 2d 795, 796 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“[A] district
court maintains jurisdiction over such a petition [to enforce a subpoena under 9
U.S.C. § 7] if the situs of the pending arbitration is within its jurisdiction.”); Thomp-
son v. Zavin, 607 F. Supp. 780, 783 n.5 (D.C. Cal. 1984) (noting that the only federal
court that has the power to enforce or issue a nonparty subpoena under the FAA is
the district court in which the arbitrators were “sitting”).
93. See, e.g., In re Sec. Life Insur. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 870-71 (8th Cir. 2000);
Am. Fed’n of Television and Radio Artists, AFL-CIO v. WJBK-TV, 164 F.3d 1004,
1009 (6th Cir. 1999); Festus & Helen Stacy Found. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner &
Smith Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2006); SchlumbergerSema, Inc. v.
Xcel Energy, Inc., No. Civ. 02-4304PAMJSM, 2004 WL 67647, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 9,
2004); In re Arbitration Between the Procter and Gamble Co. and Allianz Ins. Co.,
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the most recent decisions on this issue, Festus & Helen Stacy Foun-
dation, upheld the validity of prehearing document subpoenas is-
sued to nonparties, characterizing the scope of discovery as a
“procedural question” that should be left for the arbitrators to
determine.94
Similarly, in June 2007, the Southern District of New York en-
forced an arbitrator’s order compelling the production of docu-
ments from a nonparty who was a signatory to the arbitration
agreement between the two parties to the arbitration.95
By contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
and Fourth Circuits, as well as a district court in the First Circuit,
have taken a far less deferential view with respect to document
discovery from nonparties prior to the hearing.96  In 2007, the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts addressed this issue as a matter of first im-
pression in the First Circuit.  The court granted a nonparty’s
motion to dismiss an arbitral subpoena that sought prehearing doc-
ument production.97  While acknowledging the jurisdictional split,
the court found the cases in the Third and Fourth Circuits—Hay
Group and COMSAT—more persuasive on this issue, as opposed
to the decisions set forth above that have upheld prehearing non-
party document subpoenas by arbitrators under the FAA:
I recognize the split of authority.  I think that the two more per-
suasive cases are the Fourth and Third Circuit cases, particularly
the Third Circuit case, and that this is not—this document sub-
poena, which on its face simply calls for the delivery or produc-
tion of documents and doesn’t even include a witness in its
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26025, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2003); In re Meridian Bulk
Carriers, Ltd., No. 03-2011, 2003 WL 23181011, at *2 (E.D. La. July 17, 2003); Integ-
rity Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Amgen
Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Del. County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878, 883 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Mead-
ows Indem. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42, 45 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); Stanton v.
Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
94. Festus & Helen Stacy Found., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
95. See In re Arbitration Between Live Receivables Trust and Syndicate 102 at
Lloyd’s of London, No. M8-85 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007), reprinted in 18-2 MEALEY’S
LITIG. REP. REINSURANCE 3 (2007).
96. See, e.g., Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 410 (3d
Cir. 2004); COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275-76 (4th Cir. 1999);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. White Mountains Ins. Group Ltd., No. 06-11901 (D. Mass.
Feb. 26, 2007), reprinted in 17-22 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. REINSURANCE 4 (2007).
97. Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 13-14, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. vs.
White Mountains Ins. Group, Ltd., No. 06-11901-GAO (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2007), re-
printed in 17-22 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. REINSURANCE 4 (2007).
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scope, is simply not the kind of subpoena that is contemplated
by the statute [section 7 of the FAA].98
Because of the obvious split in jurisdictions on whether an arbi-
trator has the power to conduct prehearing nonparty document
production under section 7 of the FAA, it is likely that courts will
determine this issue on a case-by-case basis, depending on the law
of the nonparty jurisdiction to which the parties and arbitrators are
subject.  Nonetheless, it remains clear that courts are far more will-
ing to uphold documentary discovery, as opposed to depositions,
prior to the hearing.
III. CONFIDENTIALITY
As reinsurance arbitrations have become more contentious, so
too has the issue of whether arbitration should remain confidential.
Many commentators, however, consider confidentiality as one of
the hallmarks and attractions of the arbitral process.99  Many insur-
ers, reinsurers, and other commercial entities do not want to risk
the disclosure of sensitive business or proprietary information or
potentially bind themselves to legal positions adopted by arbitra-
tion panels.100
An arbitration agreement may contain a confidentiality provi-
sion, which provides:  “The parties undertake and agree that all ar-
bitral proceedings conducted by reference to this clause will be
kept strictly confidential, and all information disclosed in the
course of such arbitral proceedings will be used solely for the pur-
pose of those proceedings.”101
When a contract contains a confidentiality provision, this issue is
generally resolved without the need for intervention by arbitrators,
as parties often concede that the proceedings are to remain confi-
dential.102  Problems arise, however, when a contract is silent as to
confidentiality.103  For example, in the reinsurance context, when a
cedent and a reinsurer are engaged in multiple arbitrations involv-
ing similar contracts and issues, one party may oppose confidential-
ity so that it can use favorable awards, orders, or testimony from
prior arbitrations, which are traditionally subject to a confidential-
98. Id.
99. See STARING, supra note 36, § 22:6[2]. R
100. See id.
101. Hans Bagner, Confidentiality in Arbitration:  Don’t Take it for Granted!, 11-16
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. REINSURANCE 9 (2000).
102. See id.
103. Id.; see also STARING, supra note 36, § 22:6[2]. R
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ity agreement, against the other party in current and future arbitra-
tions between them.  Furthermore, even if a confidentially
agreement is in place, a party may still attempt to unilaterally
amend or even breach the agreement if the party believes it can
influence an arbitration panel.104  Faced with this potential scena-
rio, the party seeking the protections of confidentiality will look to
the court for relief.105
The FAA does not explicitly state whether arbitrations are re-
quired to be kept confidential or whether arbitrators have the au-
thority to impose confidentiality.106  Federal courts have also failed
to address whether there is a duty to maintain confidentiality in
arbitrations under federal law.107  Several commentators have ar-
gued that, even in the absence of a confidentiality agreement, it is
customary for parties to arbitration to keep the proceeding confi-
dential.108  Others have advocated for the position that arbitrations
should not be confidential unless the parties have agreed to such
terms.109
Recent decisions from foreign courts further illustrate the diver-
gence of opinions with respect to this issue.  In 2004, the English
Court of Appeals held that arbitration proceedings are not confi-
dential per se, dismissing the traditional view held by English
courts that there is a legal right and duty of confidentiality in arbi-
tration.110  Instead, the Court of Appeals held that, absent an ex-
press agreement to the contrary, courts should determine whether
arbitrations should remain confidential on a case-by-case basis and
employ a balancing test in which “the factors militating in favour of
publicity have to be weighed together with the desirability of pre-
104. See STARING, supra note 36, § 22:6[2]. R
105. See id. (pointing out that the court may set aside an arbitration award where
the arbitrators, under pressure from one of the parties, failed to comply with the con-
fidentiality clause of the arbitration agreement (citing Western Employers Ins. Co. v.
Jeffries & Co., 958 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1992))).
106. Derek Lisk, Confidentiality of Arbitrations, 63 TEX. B.J. 234, 236-37 (2000); see
also 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 (West 2007).  Federal law, however, provides for confidential-
ity in administrative dispute resolution procedures. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 574 (West 2007).
107. See Lisk, supra note 106, at 237. R
108. See Lawrence S. Greengrass & Brigitte M. Nahas, Do Arbitrators Have the
Power to Impose Confidentiality?, ARIAS-U.S. Q., First Quarter 2004, at 27, available
at http://www.arias-us.org/mp_files/img_ftp/arias2004-Q1.pdf.
109. Id.
110. See Dr. Christoph Henkel, The Evaluation of Privacy and Confidentiality in
International Commercial Arbitrations by the English Court of Appeals in City of Mos-
cow v. Bankers Trust, 15-19 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. REINSURANCE 13 (2005) (citing
Dep’t of Economic Policy and Develop. of the City of Moscow v. Bankers Trust Co.,
[2005] (Q.B.) 207).
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serving the confidentiality of the original arbitration and its subject
matter.”111  Notably, the Court of Appeals relied upon courts in
Australia and New Zealand that rejected the notion that confiden-
tiality is essential to the arbitral process.112
Similarly, at least one Swedish court has held that there is no
implied or inherent duty of confidentiality in an arbitration agree-
ment.113  The court noted that “unless the parties have expressly
provided that [the] information is to remain confidential, there is
no implied legal duty of confidentiality.”114  Other foreign jurisdic-
tions, however, have held that arbitration is presumed
confidential.115
While federal courts have yet to address whether arbitrators
have the authority to impose confidentiality under the FAA, one
recent state court decision, City of Newark v. Law Department of
New York, held that an arbitration panel lacked the authority to
prevent a nonparty to an arbitration agreement from obtaining cer-
tain documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law
(“FOIL”), despite the fact that the panel had issued a confidential-
ity order.116  Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court noted that
“[a]rbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion,” and thus, the
panel had no authority to prevent the nonparty from discovery.117
Nonetheless, the precedential value of City of Newark is limited
with respect to the confidentiality of arbitrations under the FAA,
since the underlying arbitration in that case did not arise under that
statute.118
It is arguable whether the issue of confidentiality is within the
scope of “procedural” powers left for arbitrators.  Recent deci-
sions, relying on Supreme Court precedent, have held that arbitra-
tors, not courts, have the authority to decide procedural issues
pursuant to the FAA.119  The ARIAS-US arbitration rules also dic-
tate that arbitrations should be confidential and that arbitrators
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Esso Australia Resources Ltd. v. Plowman, 128 A.L.R. 391 (1995)
and Television New Zealand Ltd. v. Langley Prod. Ltd., [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 250).
113. See Bagner, supra note 101, at 1. R
114. Id. at 3.
115. See Greengrass & Nahas, supra note 108, at 26. R
116. 760 N.Y.S.2d 431, 436 (App. Div. 2003).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451-52 (2003); Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84-85 (2002).
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have the authority to impose confidentiality.120  For example, the
2004 ARIAS-US procedures explicitly state that when parties disa-
gree as to the scope of confidentiality, arbitrators should use their
discretion in ordering whether and to what extent the arbitration
should remain confidential.121  On the other hand, arbitration is a
creature of contract, and there is some validity to the argument
that parties should not be bound to confidentiality absent an ex-
press agreement to the contrary.  Either way, this will be an inter-
esting issue for arbitrators and parties to monitor going forward.
IV. SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Another procedural issue that has been the subject of debate in
recent years is whether arbitrators have the authority to decide a
case by summary adjudication, absent an express agreement by the
parties to do so.
The FAA does not explicitly grant arbitrators the authority to
decide a case by summary adjudication.  Recent case law and in-
dustry commentary suggest, however, that courts and arbitrators
may recognize this power on a more consistent basis going
forward.122
In 2001, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a
motion to vacate an arbitration panel’s award that was rendered
prior to the ultimate hearing in a matter, after one of the parties
moved for dismissal of the action.123  The court noted that “there is
120. See ARIAS-U.S., ARIAS-U.S. PRACTICAL GUIDE TO REINSURANCE ARBI-
TRATION PROCEDURE 22 (2004) [hereinafter PRACTICAL GUIDE], available at http://
www.arias-us.org/pdf/Practical_Guide.pdf.  The AIDA Reinsurance and Insurance
Arbitration Society, ARIAS-U.S., is a not-for-profit corporation that promotes im-
provement of the insurance and reinsurance arbitration process for the international
and domestic markets. See ARIAS-U.S., http://www.arias-us.org/.  AIDA, the Associ-
ation Internationale de Droit des Assurances, is an international insurance organiza-
tion that was formed in 1960 for the purpose of promoting and developing knowledge
of insurance law. See AIDA, http://www.aida.org.uk/default.asp.
121. See PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 120, at 22.
122. See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 01-C-5226, 2004
WL 442640, at *2-3, *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2004), aff’d, 103 F. App’x 39 (7th Cir. 2004)
(denying a party’s motion to vacate a panel’s decision to award summary judgment
based on the parties’ position statements); Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206-
07 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming a district court’s denial of a motion to vacate an arbitral
award rendered by a panel based on a motion to dismiss filed prior to the hearing);
see also PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 120, at 24; David M. Raim & Nancy E. Mon- R
arch, Summary Disposition in Arbitration Proceedings, ARIAS-U.S. Q., Second
Quarter 2004, at 12; Robert M. Hall & Debra J. Hall, Procedures for the Resolution
of U.S. Insurance and Reinsurance Disputes 5 (2004), www.arbitrationtaskforce.org/
images/HallandHallArticle.pdf.
123. Sheldon, 269 F.3d at 1206-07.
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no express prohibition against such a procedure” and that the arbi-
trators’ actions did not deprive the party opposing the award of a
fundamentally fair hearing.124  Similarly, in 2004, the Seventh Cir-
cuit denied a party’s motion to vacate an arbitration panel’s deci-
sion to award summary judgment based on the parties’ initial
position statements filed in the matter.125
Additionally, several notable commentators in the reinsurance
industry have touted the advantages that motions for summary ad-
judication can play in the arbitral process.126  These advantages in-
clude the elimination of costly and time-consuming discovery, the
encouragement of settlements, and the promotion of the speedy
and efficient resolution of disputes.127  While summary adjudica-
tion motions have been used somewhat infrequently and granted
sparingly in reinsurance arbitration proceedings, there appears to
be some movement towards the acceptance of these motions in the
arbitral process.128
V. HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENTS
A recent decision in the Northern District of Illinois, Pacific Em-
ployers Insurance Co. v. Moglia, is another example of courts ex-
panding arbitral powers under the FAA.129  In that case, the court
examined whether an arbitration panel could compel the parties to
sign a “hold harmless” agreement in an arbitration conducted pur-
suant to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association.130  “Hold harmless” agreements are routinely
executed in reinsurance and other commercial arbitrations and
provide that the parties will not assert any claim, actions, or law-
suits against the arbitrators for matters arising out of or resulting
from the arbitration.131  These types of agreements also provide
124. Id. at 1206.
125. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd., 2004 WL 442640 at *3.
126. See PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 120, at 43; Raim & Monarch, supra note R
122, at 12; Hall & Hall, supra note 122 at 5.
127. See Raim & Monarch, supra note 122, at 12. R
128. Id.
129. No. 05 C 1366, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21967 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2007).
130. Id. at *8.
131. Id. at *4-5.  An example of a hold harmless agreement provides that the par-
ties will agree to:
[N]ot assert any claim, file any suit, or initiate any action against the Panel or
any member thereof in connection with their rendering services as arbitrator
and/or umpire in this Arbitration proceeding . . . (ii) indemnify and hold
harmless any and all expenses, costs, and fees of any kind incurred by the
members of the Panel, and the payment of their reasonable hourly fees, in
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that the parties will indemnify and hold the panel harmless against
any and all expenses, costs, and fees that may be incurred, includ-
ing their reasonable hourly fees, in connection with any action aris-
ing out of the arbitration.132
In Pacific Employers Insurance Co., one of the parties to the ar-
bitration refused to sign the hold harmless agreement, and the
panel declared that it could not proceed with the arbitration.133
After the case traveled trough the court system for several years,
the insurers filed an appeal with the Northern District of Illinois to
end the stalemate.134  The court held that the arbitrators had the
authority to require the parties to sign the hold harmless agree-
ment and ordered the objecting party to sign that agreement.135
The court relied on the FAA’s policy favoring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements, as well as other case law enunciating the
strong policy in favor of a broad grant of arbitral immunity.136
While the Pacific Employers Insurance Co. decision is yet an-
other example of the broad powers granted to arbitrators under
the FAA, the enforcement of such agreements is a power arbitra-
tors will in all likelihood rarely have to exercise, since most parties
agree to sign the hold harmless agreements.
CONCLUSION
Recent decisions illustrate that courts will show great deference
to the authority conferred to arbitrators by the FAA with respect
to many procedural issues.  Nonetheless, a great deal of inconsis-
tency remains in the judicial interpretation of certain arbitral
powers.
The resolution of disputes between parties involving the power
of arbitrators with respect to issues such as confidentiality and, es-
pecially, nonparty discovery, can often impact whether parties will
prevail in a current (or future) arbitration between them.  Moreo-
ver, the determination of these issues, as well as consolidation,
summary adjudication, and the enforceability of hold harmless




133. Id. at *2.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *12.
136. Id. at *7, *10.
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agreements, can have a substantial effect on the cost-effectiveness
and overall efficiency of arbitration—reasons that parties seek to
arbitrate their commercial disputes in the first place.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-1\FUJ103.txt unknown Seq: 26 18-JAN-08 14:58
